

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln

---

Sociology Theses, Dissertations, & Student  
Research

Sociology, Department of

---

Winter 12-2011

## Religious Affiliation and Attendance as Predictors of Immigration Attitudes in Nebraska

Courtney Lyons Breitkreutz

University of Nebraska-Lincoln, [clyonsbreitkreutz@gmail.com](mailto:clyonsbreitkreutz@gmail.com)

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologydiss>



Part of the [Sociology Commons](#)

---

Lyons Breitkreutz, Courtney, "Religious Affiliation and Attendance as Predictors of Immigration Attitudes in Nebraska" (2011). *Sociology Theses, Dissertations, & Student Research*. 15.  
<https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/sociologydiss/15>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Theses, Dissertations, & Student Research by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND ATTENDANCE AS PREDICTORS OF  
IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN NEBRASKA

by

Courtney Lyons Breitkreutz

A THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of

The Graduate College at the University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements

For the Degree of Master of Arts

Major: Sociology

Under the supervision of Professor Miguel Ceballos

Lincoln, Nebraska

December, 2011

# RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND ATTENDANCE AS PREDICTORS OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN NEBRASKA

Courtney Lyons Breitzkreutz

University of Nebraska 2011

Advisor: Miguel Ceballos

This study examines the relationship between religious affiliation, church attendance, and attitudes towards immigration. Following the ethnoreligious perspective, I predict that those who identify as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, or Catholic will hold more positive attitudes than those who do not affiliate, which would reflect the teachings of their churches. I also predict that Catholics may have particularly positive attitudes because of social identity theory. Attending church services should be associated with more positive attitudes, according to religious restructuralism. Using 2006 telephone survey data of 1,135 Nebraskans from the Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), I use binary logistic regression to test these theories and their effect on seven separate measures of immigration attitudes. I found that while affiliating with one of the religious groups did not lead to more positive attitudes, attending church services at least once a week was associated with more positive attitudes on the topics of government spending on immigrants and immigrants and crime. Results partially support religious restructuralism and the theory that church attendance, not merely identifying with a religious group, is what can improve attitudes towards immigration.

From its formation, immigrants have traveled to the United States in search of a better life. Many immigrants from around the world continue to make the journey; from the years 2000 to 2010, almost nine million newcomers made the U.S. their home (Migration Policy Institute 2011). Mexicans in particular comprise a growing proportion of these newcomers. An estimated 11.5 million lived in the U.S. in 2009, which was almost one third of all immigrants in the country (Passel and Cohn 2009). The successful adjustment of these immigrants to life in the U.S. depends in part on the response of the native-born population, making their attitudes towards immigration a relevant area of study.

Possible issues shaping individual attitudes on immigration are religious affiliation and attendance to religious services. Religion as a determinant has been “virtually ignored” in previous literature (Brenneman 2008), but recent research has shown that an individual’s religious affiliation and rate of attendance are associated with attitudes towards immigrants (Brenneman 2008; Von Der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; Knoll 2009; Daniels and Von der Ruhr 2005). These measures, therefore, could offer an additional explanation to negative attitudes towards our nation’s most recent wave of immigrants.

The most recent immigrants have settled at a much higher rate in the Midwest rather than on the coasts (Fry 2008). Nebraska is one of the Midwestern states experiencing this surge in the foreign-born, mostly due to the growing food-processing industry in rural communities (Dalla 2005). Immigration to the more rural communities

in these states warrants closer study to examine how attitudes may be shaped in these areas specifically rather than looking only at the national level as a whole.

Using the 2006 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), this study will explore the relationships between religious affiliation, attendance and attitudes towards immigration of individuals in the state of Nebraska. Specifically, does one's religious affiliation as Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, or lack of affiliation influence one's opinions of immigrants and immigration? Based on Green's (2007) ethnoreligious perspective and Tajfel's and Turner's (1979) social identity theory, I predict that immigration attitudes will vary by membership in these groups.

This study will also examine the relationship between religious attendance and immigration attitudes, regardless of religious affiliation. Researchers have found that attendance to religious services can be a factor for whether church beliefs influence individual beliefs (Green 2007; Lee 2002; Zaller 1992). Therefore, it is necessary to measure whether the frequency of attending religious services affects immigration attitudes, rather than just looking at the religious affiliation to which one belongs. Based on Green's religious restructuralism theory, I predict that frequency of attendance will also be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

An extensive body of literature exists on what shapes attitudes towards immigrants. Among the variables studied, religious affiliation and the frequency of attending religious services could be a significant factor. Literature has also shown that

one's religious affiliation and frequency of attendance has the capacity to shape other attitudes, providing justification to examine these possible determinants further and how they may be associated with attitudes towards immigrants.

### *Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration*

Although exploring how religion and immigration attitudes are linked is a relatively new area of research, examining how individual's views on immigration are shaped has been a continued effort by researchers in the field, and many possible determinants have been identified. Partly because of a self-interested orientation and perception of a competition for jobs, researchers have studied extensively how individuals' education, income, and skill-level are associated with attitudes towards immigration. More recently, however, researchers have looked at how all of these variables may be related to each other in shaping individual attitudes in a variable they call "cosmopolitanism".

One's education has been found to lead to positive attitudes towards immigration (Simon 1985; Moore 1986; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; McDaniel et al. 2011), partially because it is oftentimes lower-educated workers who actually must compete with immigrants for jobs. Using data from the 1994 General Social Survey, Chandler and Tsai (2001) were able to examine a variety of possible variables and found that having a college education had the most impact on immigration views. "College education seems to be a powerful agent for engendering pro-immigration sentiment," they concluded (185). Although their research focused solely on

attitudes towards undocumented immigration, Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found further evidence that education contributes to more positive attitudes.

Because of the association between education and income, one would expect income to also be associated with immigration attitudes. However, income has not always shown an effect and oftentimes leads to mixed results (Citrin et al. 1997; Wilson 1994). Dustmann and Preston (2007) actually found that higher income was linked with more negative immigration attitudes compared to those with a lower income possibly, they said, because of the fear that taxes would go to immigrants in the form of welfare. However, Citrin et al. (1997) found that personal economic circumstances, including income, were of little importance in determining attitudes towards immigration policy.

However, a worker's skill-level has been found to be associated with immigration attitudes. Both Polavieja and Ortega (2010) and Mayda (2006) found that those who worked in higher-skilled jobs were less threatened by low-skilled immigrants. Both Haubert and Fussell (2006) and Dustmann and Preston (2007) found that labor market competition between immigrants and native-born low-skill manual workers results in more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Previous research has found a relationship between living in a rural area and more negative immigration attitudes. Many studies analyzed support for increases or decreases in immigration levels and found that rural residents held more restrictionist policy views towards immigration (Fennelly and Federico 2008; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Both Greenberg et al. (2004) and Bean et al. (2000) found that rural residents thought that immigrants impinged on their quality of life. There is a

perception that most immigrants are undocumented (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996), and Fennelly and Federico (2008) point out that “this perception may be particularly prevalent in rural communities where food processing and agricultural businesses employ large numbers of undocumented workers” (153).

Past research has found that political ideology has some effect on immigration attitudes, especially if one views immigration as a matter of public policy (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Citrin et al. 1990; Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003). These studies have found that having a more liberal ideology is associated with more positive immigration attitudes or with being more open to increasing numbers of immigrants. Similarly, age is often found to be negatively associated with immigration attitudes, with attitudes becoming more negative as age increases (Von der Ruhr and Daniels 2003; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).

One reason that more urban, educated, or liberal people have more positive immigration attitudes could be because of a more global worldview, or what has been called by researchers as “cosmopolitanism”. Measured by variables such as education, job skill-level, whether one has traveled abroad, and holding liberal values, many studies have shown that a more global perspective can be associated with more positive immigration attitudes (Betts 1988; Bean 1995; Haubert and Fussell 2006; Chandler and Tsai 2001).

Gender has shown to have some effect on immigration attitudes. Females are usually found to have more positive attitudes (Chandler and Tsai 2001). These findings follow previous research that find that females tend to have a more “other”-oriented



perspective when compared to males because of differences in gender socialization (Beutel and Marini 1995; Cross and Madson 1997), especially when regarding race (Johnson and Marini 1998). For example, according to Beutel and Marini (1995), females are more likely than males to express concern and responsibility for the well-being of others, probably as a result of differences in how they are raised. This empathy for others could also pertain to immigrants and result in more positive attitudes towards them.

Researchers have studied how cultural determinants can influence attitudes towards immigration, regardless of one's own individual characteristics. One theory is that native-born individuals feel a sense of threat to their culture and everyday life, rather than threat to their economic well-being. Quillian (1995) calls this "group threat" and defines it as "the perception by the dominant group that an outside group threatens their group's prerogatives" (586). McLaren (1996), Tajfel (1982), and Hood and Morris (1998) focus on this feeling of group identity and the feelings of threat it can raise towards an out-group. Brenneman (2008) points out that "negative attitudes toward immigrants...are often based more on cultural and identity threats than on actual competition for resources" (9). For example, Chandler and Tsai (2001) found that a perceived cultural threat to the English language had the most impact on immigration views.

*Religious Affiliation and Attendance as a Determinant of Individual Attitudes*

Like the factors above, religious affiliation and attendance could be important determinants in better understanding how attitudes are formed. Studies have shown that one's religious beliefs can actually shape one's attitudes on various topics that may not be clearly religious in nature. Steensland et al. (2000) assert that "Americans are more involved in religious groups than in any other type of voluntary organization, and the breadth and depth of this involvement exert a strong influence on contemporary social and political issues" (309). For example, religion has been shown to influence civic participation, activism, and even election outcomes. Welch and Leege (1988) found that Catholics' religious practices and beliefs influenced their sociopolitical beliefs and political ideology, moving them towards more liberal views. Green (2007) found that presidential voting preferences often depend on religious affiliation, with those in some minority religious groups more likely to vote for Democratic candidates. Wald et al. (1988) argued that the ideology of a church influences the individual political ideology of its members. Verba et al. (1995) demonstrated that increased religious participation was associated with increased levels of civic participation such as voting and participation in political activism. If individuals view immigration as a public policy issue, religious affiliation could also influence individual opinions on immigration. With immigration policy constantly being a political talking point among politicians and a mainstay of divisive campaign rhetoric each election cycle, being more vocal about immigration may be a part of the increased political activism among those who affiliate with a religious group and attend services.

Also closely linked to the potential for influencing immigration attitudes, is the consistent finding that one's religious affiliation influences one's stance on certain moral issues. Such studies have found that attitudes on abortion (Leege 1983), same-sex marriage (Wood and Bartkowski 2004; Whitehead 2010), and euthanasia (Hamil-Luker and Smith 1998; Sikora 2009) can all be shaped by one's religious tradition.

Immigration, if couched in a humanitarian or human rights context, could be viewed as a possible moral issue similar to these. Therefore, if individuals see immigration as a political or moral issue either in addition to or instead of solely an economic issue, this research shows that religion as a determinant should not be overlooked.

Some research has shown that how often (or whether) one attends religious services is important in shaping individual views. For example, McIntosh et al. (1979) found in their study of white Protestants and Catholics that those who attended church more frequently were more likely to be anti-abortion regardless of denominational preference. In studying attitudes towards euthanasia, Sikora (2009) showed that both religious denomination and attendance mattered, with those with higher levels of attendance being more likely to be against euthanasia. Similarly, Michaud (2008) found that church attendance was a better predictor than religious denomination of environmental attitudes towards climate change. Green (2007) demonstrated that religious attendance was associated with presidential voting preferences, with those who attend more often being more likely to vote for the Republican candidate over the Democrat.

Furthermore, Green found that those who attended church more often were more “religiously salient”, meaning that respondents believed that religion dictated much of their lives. In general, past research has found that those who attend church more frequently are more likely to hold beliefs that are consistent with the church and follow the endorsements of the church leaders (Lee 2002; Zaller 1992). This research suggests that an individual’s thinking will more likely reflect church doctrine when the individual attends church, not just if they identify with that religion.

#### *Religious Affiliation, Attendance and Immigration Attitudes*

Recent research has provided evidence that there is a relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes and has found that attitudes towards immigration varied depending on religious affiliation (Knoll 2009; Brenneman 2008; Daniels and von der Ruhr 2005). Exactly how each religious group influences immigration attitudes may vary depending on each church’s teachings.

To explore how immigration attitudes may vary among Mainline Protestants, Evangelical Protestants, and Catholics in the study and between those who do and do not affiliate with a religious group, it is necessary to understand what each of the churches’ beliefs are on the issue of immigration. Instead of looking directly at church doctrine, which can be often be interpreted differently and selectively depending on each individual, it may be more useful to examine direct cues from religious leaders. These cues may have more potential than doctrine to be heard and internalized by church members (Knoll 2009). Much research has demonstrated the possibility that public

political statements and agreement by church clergy can influence church members' attitudes on various issues (Djupe and Gilbert 2002; Smidt 2004; Campbell and Monson 2003). Knoll (2009) adds that "is it possible that members of religious traditions and denominations whose leaders officially and/or publicly endorse a certain type of immigration reform should be more likely to support those same reform policies" (315).

However, it should be noted that other literature exists that finds that clergy, especially those in Evangelical denominations, hold different views (possibly more positive towards immigration) than their congregants (. Regardless, it is still possible that positive messages on immigration are reaching members even if many members still hold less positive views than their clergy.

The three religious affiliations in this analysis, the Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and Mainline Protestant churches, have all been outright about their positive support for immigrants and immigration reform that would benefit immigrants. The Catholic Church, especially, has been very strong in its support for immigrants and immigration reform. According to the website of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, their position is as follows: "We bishops commit ourselves and all the members of our church communities to continue the work of advocacy for laws that respect the human rights of immigrants and preserve the unity of the immigrant family... We join with others of good will in a call for legalization opportunities for the maximum number of undocumented persons, particularly those who have built equities and otherwise contributed to their communities" (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 2002).

Leaders of Evangelical Protestant churches, although more diverse than Catholics because different denominations are included, have also expressed support for immigrants. The Southern Baptist Church, the largest Evangelical denomination in the United States (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2010), has endorsed a guest-worker program for undocumented immigrants and also expressed support for granting amnesty (Land 2006). Richard Land, head of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, has said, “We have an obligation to support the government and the government’s laws for conscience’ [sic] sake (Romans 13:7)... As citizens of the Lord’s heavenly Kingdom and members of local colonies of that Kingdom, we also have a divine mandate to act redemptively and compassionately toward those who are in need” (Land 2006).

Leith Anderson, president of the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), has expressed support for immigrants as have other leaders in the organization (Vu 2009). NAE even has a humanitarian branch called World Relief that provides legal services to immigrants, helps settle refugees, and provides other assistance such as English classes. Officially, the organization points to the biblical foundations for welcoming immigrants and supports expanded avenues through which immigrants can enter the U.S., emphasis on family reunification, and ways for those who are undocumented to earn legal status (NAE 2009).

Mainline Protestant churches, although also more diverse than the Catholic Church, have shown their support as well. The website of the Episcopal Migration Ministries quotes their Presiding Bishop: “To make enforcement a central provision of

our immigration policy not only fails to honor our historic tradition of offering refuge to the oppressed, but also denies the call of Christ to welcome the stranger as if we were receiving Him as our guest” (Griswold 2006). The Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (ELCA) stated that it supports a plan to “provide a path to permanence for individuals currently residing and working in the United States as well as their families” (Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2007). The United Methodist (Gilbert 2007) and the Presbyterian Church (Presbyterian Church (USA) Office of Immigration Issues 2006) have similar statements on their respective websites.

Only a few studies exist that examine how religion, whether measured through affiliation or attendance, can affect immigration attitudes. Much of this research focuses on immigration policy preferences and the economy and not on feelings towards immigrants or their possible impact. For example, both Von der Ruhr and Daniels (2003) and Daniels and Von der Ruhr (2005) measured whether religious affiliation affected whether respondents believed immigration levels should be increased, decreased, or kept stable. In the 2003 study, Jewish respondents were more likely to prefer that the number of immigrants be increased, and in both 2003 and 2005 they found that those who belonged to more fundamentalist denominations supported more restrictionist immigration policies.

Similarly, McDaniel et al. (2011) in a national survey measured level of negative attitudes towards immigrants with an index of eight items including whether the respondent believed immigrants were a burden, did not pay taxes or learn English, took jobs away from native-born, or threatened traditional American values. They found

support for what they called “Christian nationalism” in Evangelical Protestants, and that this negatively affected their views of immigrants compared to Catholics and Mainline Protestants. They defined Christian nationalism as “a religiously informed interpretation of America’s national identity” and that Christian nationalists “believe that America has a divinely inspired mission and link its success to God’s favor” (205). In other words, those who ascribed to Christian nationalism believed that immigrants were a threat to an existing American identity and that Evangelical Protestants were more likely to hold this belief than other religious groups.

Brenneman (2008) used 1994 General Social Survey data to examine how religious affiliation and attendance affects immigration attitudes. Here, Catholics were more likely than other religious groups to be supportive of continued or increased levels of immigration. One explanation, however, was that the national sample contained more Catholics who were probably immigrants themselves. Jewish respondents were found to have more open views as well compared to the other religious groups. Brenneman also found that those who attended church more frequently were also more supportive of continued or increased levels of immigration.

Knoll (2009) used 2006 Immigration Survey data collected by the Pew Hispanic Center to measure whether religious affiliation or attendance affected respondents’ views on immigration policy preferences. Higher rates of attendance across denominations were strongly associated with more liberal policy preferences (guest worker programs and amnesty). Again Jewish as well as Latter Day Saints Protestants held more liberal policy attitudes.



Therefore, recent research on the focal relationship of religious affiliation and attendance on immigration attitudes has been limited and produced mixed results. Some studies showed evidence of negative attitudes among Evangelicals and fundamentalists and positive attitudes among Catholics, but these findings have not been consistent across multiple studies. Furthermore, this research uses only national samples, which fails to look at effects that could be unique to smaller geographic areas. Dependent measures of immigration attitudes is largely based on policy preferences gained only using one or two survey items and not on more comprehensive measures that past literature on immigration attitudes show is possible (such as attitudes on how immigration affects culture or crime rates). By surveying respondents about how they believe immigration affects the economy, a community's cultural diversity, crime, and their opinions on government policies concerning immigration, this research attempts to encapsulate more of the potential ways that individuals could express immigration attitudes and not just broad policy preferences such as to whether they think immigration levels should change.

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

Three theories shape the theoretical bases for my hypotheses: Green's (2007) ethnoreligious perspective, his religious restructuralism perspective, and Tajfel's and Turner's (1979) Social Identity theory. The ethnoreligioius perspective asserts that there is a direct link between one's religious tradition and individual attitudes. It is in the self-identification of a particular denomination (along with those denomination's traditions, values, beliefs, and cues from church leaders) and not necessarily church attendance that

drives the effect of religious affiliation on personal attitudes. For example, Catholics who no longer attend church may still hold beliefs that follow Catholic teachings because of prior socialization. Although Green originally used the theory to describe differences in political behavior, Knoll (2009) argued the theory could also explain differences in immigration attitudes among denominations. If this theory holds here, we should expect members of the three religious affiliations to reflect the positive messages of their respective churches compared to those who do not affiliate. Although some research has found that Evangelical Protestants hold more restrictionist or negative views, others have not and I expect that the ethnoreligious theory will apply and positive doctrine and messages will be salient.

Social Identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) states that people identify with and behave as part of in-groups and may display prejudice feelings and discriminatory actions against those who are not part of that group. In other words, one's self concept is derived from group memberships. Part of the theory is that members maximize differences between those not in the in-group to strengthen one's own identity as part of the in-group. These distinct social groups form as a result of these in-groups and out-groups and can result in differences in attitudes and behavior between these groups, especially the behavior of one group towards another (Hogg et al. 1995). Because members of religious groups self-identify in this survey, they could be viewed as constituting social groups which differentiate from each other, meaning that there could be differences in how members of each religious group think about immigration.

One important factor is that many immigrants, especially those arriving in Nebraska, are Catholic. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2009), seventy-four percent of the foreign born are Catholic, most of who are Latinos. From 2000 to 2010, Nebraska's population growth was sixty-three percent Hispanic (United States Census 2010). Because immigrants arriving in Nebraska are more likely to be Catholic and because Catholics may perceive immigrants as more likely to be Catholic, Catholics in this study may hold more positive immigration attitudes if the tenets of Social Identity theory hold true. Furthermore, Catholics in particular have a long history in the United States as an oppressed minority group. Once a target of the Ku Klux Klan and other white power groups, Catholics may still feel a connection and in-group tie to this historical legacy. Additionally, the Catholic Church already has a more clearly defined pro-immigrant stance, a more structured hierarchical system to communicate that stance, and a richer history of supporting immigrants than the other religious groups, meaning that the ethnoreligious theory could apply as well.

The religious restructuralism perspective predicts that it is the commitment and behavior in religion of each individual that has the most impact on individual attitudes, rather than denomination. Therefore, in addition to religious affiliation, it is important to examine how commitment to that religion might matter in shaping immigration attitudes. Green measures commitment by how often the respondent attends religious services. Because of each church's positive stance on immigration, we should find that going to church improves attitudes.

Following the above theoretical framework, the hypotheses are:

H1: Those who affiliate as Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical Protestant will hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than those who are unaffiliated.

H2: Catholics will hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than the other religious groups.

H3: Attendance, regardless of religious affiliation, will have a positive association with attitudes towards immigration.

Therefore, Hypothesis 1 tests the ethnoreligious perspective, Hypothesis 2 tests both ethnoreligious perspective and social identity theory, and Hypothesis 3 tests religious restructuring.

## DATA

This study will analyze individual attitudes by using the 2006 Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), a random digit dialing telephone survey of 1,821 adults in Nebraska conducted by the Bureau of Sociological Research (BOSR) at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. BOSR has conducted the cross-sectional survey on the quality of life in Nebraska since 1977, and issues covered vary from year to year. The sampling frame used is non-institutionalized persons living in households with listed telephone numbers across Nebraska, excluding those under 19 years of age, those in custodial institutions and on military reservations, and those without telephones. Once a person is reached within the sampling frame, the person in the household to be interviewed is chosen based on a computer-generated random number. People without listed telephone numbers or without telephones are in our population but not able to be in the sampling frame.

For all variables, those with missing cases were dropped and not included in the analysis. Although, the full dataset includes 1,821 people, after dropping those who were not categorized into one of the four religious groups in the analysis (Mainline Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Unaffiliated) or who did not answer the demographic variables used, the total number of respondents used for the analysis comes to 1,135. Total  $n$  drops to 965 for analyses only among those who affiliate with a religious group. For each regression, missing data from the seven dependent variables was also dropped. Therefore, each dependent variable has a different  $n$ , but this method prevents respondents from being dropped from the analysis who failed to answer all seven survey questions used to form the dependent variables. A description of all variables used for analyses can be found in Table 1.

(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE)

Because of the sampling procedure utilized, the data used for this analysis should be fairly representative of Nebraskans as a whole. As expected with telephone surveys, older respondents were overrepresented, with 25.6% of this sample being over 65, while 2009 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates predict the number is only 13.3%. Following this trend, those in the sample who were 45 to 64 made up 41.8%, but make up only 25.0% of ACS estimates. Younger respondents were underrepresented, with only 4.2% of the sample being 19 to 24, with 11.0% of ACS respondents being 18 to 24. ACS estimates the number of 25-44 year-olds to be 36.7%, with only 28.4% of the sample being in this age group. Females were also overrepresented at 59.8% of the sample but

only 50.7% of Census estimates (2010). Weights were calculated for each respondent according to these variables and used for each analysis.

### *Dependent Variables*

Seven separate variables were used to measure respondents' attitudes towards immigration. Topics covered include government spending on immigrants and immigration's effect on crime, diversity, and the economy. These areas reflect previous literature's findings on how respondents voice these attitudes and allow for higher content validity of the overall measure of immigration attitudes. Although some of the items reflect similar content, I chose to study them individually because of low Cronbach's alphas when combined. Refer to Table 2 for the distribution and *n*'s of these variables.

(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE)

There were two 5-item formats to these questions. The first ranged from strongly agreed to strongly disagreed. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with one of the following scenarios: "immigrants improve the economy of my community", "the government spends too much money assisting immigrants", and "immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community". Variables were reverse coded so that 1="strongly disagree", 2="disagree", 3="neither agree or disagree", 4="agree", and 5="strongly agree".

The second format ranged from very likely to very unlikely. Respondents were asked if the following scenarios were likely or unlikely when asked "What do you think

will happen as a result of more immigrants to your community”: “higher economic growth”, “people born in my community losing their jobs”, “higher crime rates”, and “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”. Variables were reverse coded so that 1=“very unlikely”, 2= “somewhat unlikely”, 3= “neither likely or unlikely”, 4= “somewhat likely”, and 5= “very likely”.

Respondents were particularly negative on the topics of government spending on immigration and how they thought immigration affected crime rates. An overwhelming majority of those surveyed (69.6%) agreed with the statement that “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”, with only 19.2% disagreeing. Over two-thirds of the sample (67.8%) said that “higher crime rates” were likely as a result of more immigrants coming to their community. Well over a quarter (28.9%) responded that higher crime rates were “very likely”. Similarly, about half (49.1%) disagreed that “immigrants improve the economy of my community”, and 53.9% thought it was unlikely that immigration would result in “higher economic growth”. Respondents were divided on how likely the scenario of “people born in my community losing their jobs” would be due to immigration, with 47.9% saying that it was unlikely and 46.0% saying it was likely.

Respondents were more positive about the possibility for more diversity and openness. Over half (57.5%) agreed that “immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”. Two-thirds (66%) thought it was likely that immigration was “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”.

For analysis, these response choices were collapsed into dichotomous variables, with “strongly agree”/“very likely” and “agree”/“somewhat likely”=1 and “neither agree or disagree”/“neither likely or unlikely”, “disagree”/“somewhat unlikely”, and “strongly disagree”/“very unlikely”=0. In other words, those coded as 1 are all respondents who agreed with the statement of each dependent variable or thought the scenario in that statement was likely with immigration.

### *Independent Variables*

Respondents were grouped into four separate religious affiliations: *Catholics*, *Mainline Protestants*, *Evangelical Protestants*, and *Unaffiliated*. These groups were formed using the RELTRAD classification method, which groups single denominations into seven larger groups by those sharing similar doctrine and religious tradition (Steensland et al. 2000). In determining the categorization of denominations as either Evangelical or Mainline, Steensland et al. (2000) note that “Mainline denominations have typically emphasized an accommodating stance toward modernity, a proactive view on issues of social and economic justice, and pluralism in their tolerance of varied individual beliefs” (293-294). Conversely, Evangelical denominations “have typically sought more separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines” (294). This method is considered an improvement over previous classification schemes because it more accurately organizes Mainline and Evangelical Protestants and is better able to



study trends in American religion because of more accurate classification of all denominations.

In both this sample and nationally, the four groups included as independent variables are the largest and encapsulate most of the total population. According to a 2007 survey conducted by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Evangelical Protestants are the largest group at 26.3%, followed closely by Catholics (23.9%), then Mainline Protestants (18.1%), and lastly Unaffiliated (16.1%). This sample of Nebraskans shows similar numbers for who the four largest groups are, but Catholics have the most members at 25.0%, followed by Mainline Protestants (20.8%), Evangelical Protestants (18.3%), and Unaffiliated (12.9%). Those labeled as unaffiliated answered no to the question “Regardless of whether you now attend religious services, do you identify with any particular religious tradition, denomination, or church?” Those who did not fit into one of these four groups (such as those who identified as Jewish or Muslims) were dropped from the analysis because they made up a very small proportion of the total *n*. Also, because the Protestant groups required a longer line of questioning to determine RELTRAD classification, it is possible that more Protestants were dropped from the survey before being placed into one of the four groups.

A variable was also created to indicate those who affiliate with any of the three religious groups. *Affiliated* is labeled as 1= Catholic, Mainline Protestant, or Evangelical Protestant and 0= Unaffiliated. Refer to Table 3 for the distribution and *n*’s for the religious groups.

(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE)

As discussed above, church attendance may affect immigration attitudes separately from religious affiliation. Therefore, attendance is included and measured by the variable *Frequent Attendance* (1= “several times a week” or “once a week” and 0= “nearly every week”, “about once a month”, “several times a year”, “about once a year”, “less than once a year”, and “never”. Over half of respondents said they were frequent attendees (55.4%). Refer to Table 3 for distribution and *n*’s of the attendance variables.

### *Controls*

Researchers have found many possible determinants of immigration attitudes. These previous findings guided the selection of control variables. Education is measured by *Some College* (1= “some college, but no degree” or “technical/associate/junior college”) and *Bachelor’s Degree or Higher* (1= “bachelor’s degree” or “graduate degree”). Those with a high school diploma or less are the omitted category. Age is measured continuously by the respondent’s age at the time of completing the survey. *Female* is the respondent’s sex (1= “female”). Political ideology was measured by *liberal* (1= “very liberal” and “liberal”) and *conservative* (1= “conservative” and “very conservative”). Those who responded “middle-of-the-road” are the omitted category. All respondents who did not answer “white (Caucasian)” were collapsed into the control variable *nonwhite* (Minorities make up only 5.7% of the sample). Urbanity is measured by *urban* (1= “town or city”, 0= “farm” and “open country but not a farm”). *Income* was recoded to a five-category variable consisting of equal \$25,000 increments to facilitate

interpretation (1= \$24,999 or less and 5= \$100,000 or more). Refer to Table 3 for distribution and  $n$ 's of these variables.

## METHOD

I use Binary Logistic Regression (Long 1997) as my analysis technique. This statistical method allows for determining the differential outcomes that the independent variables have on the outcome of the dependent variable. Odds ratios were used to calculate the likelihood of respondents agreeing with each dependent variable or the likelihood they believed each statement was more likely with immigration.

The analysis contains seven models. Model 1 tests the focal relationship between having a religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. This model only includes variables measuring religious affiliation for each of the seven dependent variables. According to Hypothesis 1 and the ethnoreligious perspective that posits that there is an association between religious affiliation and individual attitudes, those who affiliate should have more positive attitudes towards immigration.

Model 2 includes the control variables to examine their effect on the focal relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. A reduction of any significant findings from Model 1 could be interpreted as moderating the effect of the controls on the focal relationship.

Model 3 tests the effect of specific religious affiliation on immigration attitudes, with *Catholic* and *Evangelical Protestant* as independent variables (Those who are unaffiliated are dropped from this and later models, bringing the total  $n$  to 965). Here we

can test Hypothesis 2, the prediction that both the ethnoreligious perspective and Social Identity theory will apply and Catholics will have more positive attitudes towards immigrants than the other religious groups. We will also be able to check for any unexpected variation not predicted by our hypotheses among the three religious groups in how they are associated with immigration attitudes. *Mainline Protestant* is the omitted category in this model.

Model 4 adds control variables to the relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes. Similar to Model 2, we can examine whether the control variables are influencing this focal relationship, except here those who affiliate are divided into separate religious groups. Again, a disappearance of any significant findings from Model 3 would suggest it is one of the control variables influencing results indicating a moderating relationship between religious groups and immigration attitudes.

Model 5 tests only church attendance on the dependent variables. This allows us to test Hypothesis 3 and the religious restructuralism perspective, which posits that church attendance improves attitudes regardless of religious affiliation. The added variable of church attendance should be associated with more positive attitudes if Hypothesis 3 applies.

Model 6 adds control variables to the focal relationship between church attendance and immigration attitudes. Again, a disappearance of any significant findings could mean that it is control variables- and not church attendance- which is causing differences in attitudes between frequent attendees and non-frequent attendees in Model 5. However, significant findings in this model between frequent attendance and positive

immigration attitudes would further support Hypothesis 3 and the religious restructualism perspective.

Model 7 includes each religious group, attendance, and the control variables. This allows for the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 3 simultaneously to see if there are changes from Models 3 through 6 and allows for the testing of the focal relationships of religious group and attendance on immigration attitudes. This model is needed, for example, because differences in levels of attendance could have an effect on the relationship between religious groups and not actual differences in attitudes between them<sup>1</sup>.

Mainline Protestants are the omitted category in Models 3, 4, and 7. This change was necessary because the unaffiliated are not included in Models 3, 4, and 7 as these models compare immigration attitudes only among those who attend religious services. For the control variables, “high school or lower” for the education variables and “moderate” for the political ideology variables were the omitted categories.

## RESULTS

Results from the analyses can be seen in Tables 4 through 10. Model 1 examines only the relationship between affiliating with a religious group regressed on immigration attitudes. None of the seven variables in this model had a significant relationship with those having a religious affiliation (“immigrants improve the economy of my community”, “the government spends too much money assisting immigrants”,

---

<sup>1</sup> An eighth model including interactions between religious groups and attendance was run but did not produce statistically significant results.

“immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”, “people born in my community losing their jobs”, “higher economic growth”, “higher crime rates”, and “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”).

(TABLES 4 THROUGH 10 ABOUT HERE)

Model 2 again indicates no significant relationship between the affiliated and any of the seven dependent variables after including the control variables in the analysis. Having a bachelor’s degree or higher was significant for six of the seven dependent variables and was associated with more positive attitudes ( $p \leq 0.001$ ). Some of the other control variables also had a significant relationship with a majority (4 out of 7) of the dependent variables at a significance level of at least 0.05 (*liberal*, *nonwhite*, and *urban*). All three of these control variables were associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration.

Models 3 and 4 follow the same form as the previous two models but compare only the three religious groups to each other, with those who are unaffiliated dropped from the analysis. Model 3 examines only the relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes, with Mainline Protestants as the omitted category. None of the religious groups had a significant association with any of the immigration attitudes variables, although the odds of Evangelicals agreeing with the variable “Immigrants improve the economy of my community” were somewhat less than Mainlines ( $p \leq 0.10$ ).

Model 4 adds demographic controls to the focal relationship. The odds of Evangelicals agreeing that “Immigrants improve the economy of my community” were 36 percent less, with the variable moving from marginally significant to significant from

Model 4 to Model 3 ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). Evangelicals also moved to marginal significance for the other variable regarding the economy; the odds of them responding that “higher economic growth” was a likely outcome as a result of more immigration were 31 percent less than Mainlines ( $p \leq 0.10$ ). The odds of Catholics responding that it is likely that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were 28 percent less, but this was also just marginally significant ( $p \leq 0.10$ ). Similar to Model 2, many of the controls were significant. Having at least a bachelor’s degree was associated with more positive attitudes towards immigration in 6 of the 7 variables at a significance level of 0.001. The control variables *liberal*, *nonwhite*, and *urban* were associated with more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05. Increasing age of the respondent corresponded to more negative attitudes also for 3 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.

Model 5 introduces attendance into the analysis as an independent variable. Higher attendance seems to be associated with more positive attitudes for some of the variables. The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” were 30 percent less than infrequent attendees ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). The odds of them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration were also 27 percent less ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). Finally, the odds of frequent attendees responding that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were 30 percent more but only at a significance level of 0.10.

Model 6 added the control variables to the analysis between attendance and attitudes towards immigration. Both of the findings from Model 5 remain significant.

The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” were 37 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of them responding that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration were 35 percent less ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). The finding that was marginally significant in Model 5 (that the odds of frequent attendees responding that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were more than infrequent attendees) changed to nonsignificance.

Again, holding at least a bachelor’s degree was associated with more positive attitudes for 6 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.01. *Female*, *liberal*, and *urban* were all associated with more positive attitudes for 3 of the 7 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05 as was *nonwhite* at a significance level of at least 0.01. Again, increasing age was associated with more negative attitudes for 4 variables at a significance level of at least 0.05.

Model 7 included the religious groups and attendance together in the analysis. Many of the findings from the previous models remained the same. The odds of Evangelicals agreeing that “immigrants improve the economy of my community” were 40 percent less than Mainlines (a change from 36 percent in Model 4) ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). They also again approached significance for the variable “higher economic growth”, where the odds of them believing that growth was likely as a result of higher immigration were 30 percent less (previously 31 percent) ( $p \leq 0.10$ ). In this model only, the odds of Catholics believing that more immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures” were 32 percent less at a significance level of 0.05. This was a change from



Model 4 where there was only marginal significance. The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the “government spends too much money assisting immigrants” were again less than infrequent attendees at a significance level of 0.05 (moving only from 37 percent less likely to 36 percent less likely). The odds of them believing that “higher crime rates” are likely as a result of higher immigration were again 35 percent less ( $p \leq 0.05$ ).

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study examines whether religious affiliation or attendance to religious services is associated with immigration attitudes among Nebraskans. Very little research has been done on this topic, and the research that has been done has shown that one’s religion can be an important factor in possibly shaping these attitudes. No known studies have focused only on a Midwest population, where recent high immigration patterns compared to the past could create a more complex relationship between religion and immigration attitudes. This study attempts to fill this gap by utilizing a survey where measures exist on religious affiliation, attendance, and many possible facets of how people express positive or negative feelings on immigration.

Results support previous findings that age, political ideology, race, education, gender and urbanity are all associated with immigration attitudes. There are greater odds that those who are liberal, nonwhite, female, hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and who live in an urban area hold more positive immigration attitudes on many of the measures used here. Holding at least a bachelor’s degree was particularly notable in determining

more positive attitudes for most of the dependent variables. Also, age was negatively associated with most of the measures; as age increases, attitudes become more negative.

Hypothesis 1 was not supported by the data; respondents who affiliated with one of the three religious groups analyzed here did not have more positive attitudes towards immigration compared to those who do not affiliate after control variables were added to the analysis. This means that the ethnoreligious perspective was not supported because respondents did not mirror the positive messages of their respective churches. Findings here contradict Green (2007) and his theory that identifying with a church that espouses certain attitudes through doctrine and messaging would lead to similar attitudes in individual members. The religious groups all have positive statements from church doctrine and leaders on immigrants and immigration, but this was not reflected in the data, at least as it compares to those who are unaffiliated.

Hypothesis 2 also was not supported; Catholics did not hold more positive attitudes towards immigration than the other religious groups. Social Identity theory, through the commonality of identifying as Catholic, did not result in improved attitudes by Catholic respondents towards mostly Catholic immigrants to Nebraska. More surprising was the outcome that Catholics actually held more negative attitudes for the item that immigration is “making my community more open to new ideas and cultures”. However, Social Identity theory may be working other ways if non-immigrant Catholics are perceiving immigrants as more of an out-group which supersedes their Catholic commonality. Another possible explanation is that non-immigrant Catholics are failing to recognize that the majority of the new immigrants are Catholic at all.

Evangelicals held negative attitudes for some of the dependent variables when compared to Mainlines. The odds of them agreeing that immigrants improve the economy and the odds of them believing that higher levels of immigration were not going to lead to economic growth were both less than Mainlines, although the latter held only marginal significance. These findings partially reflect results from McDaniel et al. (2011), where Evangelicals held more negative attitudes on an index of measures which included economic items. Results here are also similar to findings by Daniels and Von der Ruhr from 2003 and 2005 that showed that Evangelicals were not in favor of increased levels of immigration. Although not addressing the economy directly, perhaps Evangelicals from these studies were against immigration for fear it would damage the economy. McDaniel et al. (2011) posit that negative attitudes on immigration held by Evangelicals could be the result of Christian nationalism, a theory in which Evangelicals are more likely to feel that immigration is a threat to an existing American identity. It should be noted, however, that in this study, Evangelicals only responded negatively to these economic indicators and no differently than other religious groups for any of the five other dependent variables which included more common indicators of threat (higher crime rates and loss of jobs, for example).

The non-significant relationship between religious affiliation and immigration attitudes compared to what the ethnoreligious perspective suggests could be the result of regional differences in denominational practices and beliefs of a Midwestern compared to a national sample. Another possibility is that Nebraskans hold more similar attitudes regardless of religious affiliation, perhaps because of recent increases in the foreign-born

population, higher concentrations of Hispanics in the Midwest, and the perception that immigration is a new phenomenon to the area. Less variation in attitudes becomes more possible when people respond to a “hot-button” issue and churches’ teachings or other organizational efforts lag behind in their ability to influence attitudes.

Although Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported, results indicate support for Hypothesis 3. Attending religious services at least once a week, regardless of affiliation, was associated with more positive attitudes in two of the dependent variables. The odds of frequent attendees agreeing that the government spends too much money assisting immigrants were 36 percent less than infrequent attendees, and the odds of them believing that immigration would lead to higher crime rates were 35 percent less. This lends support for the religious restructuralism perspective where attending religious services has more of an influence on individual attitudes than simply identifying with a certain religion. In other words, the importance of attendance could be the reason Hypothesis 1 was not supported. In order for the church’s positive messages about immigration to reach church members, actually attending services is a key component, not solely identifying with that church, at least for these indicators. This supports Green’s idea that those who attend church services at higher levels are more “religiously salient”, meaning that those who attend more often allow their religion to more strongly influence their lives. Many previous researchers also noted the value of church attendance in leading to more positive attitudes towards immigration (Lee 2002; Zaller 1992; Brenneman 2008; Knoll 2009).

Regarding the main finding that attendance can help to improve immigration attitudes, it is especially important to note that church attendance is oftentimes over reported (Marler and Chaves 1993; Presser 1998). In self-administered surveys, social desirability bias can easily occur, particularly in regions where it is socially expected for people to attend church. When such a large proportion of the sample (42.2%) claims to attend church at least once per week, it is logical to expect that the actual attendance rate is at least somewhat lower.

If respondents are overreporting attendance and attendance is correlated with more positive attitudes, then I might be overestimating the importance attendance has. For example, if a respondent reports that they are a frequent attendee and that they have more positive attitudes but they actually are an infrequent attendee, it may be another variable altogether influencing both the drive to be seen as a regular church attendee and someone who is positive towards immigrants. Any issues with self-reporting are going to mask the relationship between the effect of attendance on immigration attitudes.

However, I may be instead suppressing the importance of attendance by overreporting those who are frequent attendees. Again, those who claim they attend church at least once a week may actually attend less often. Therefore, the actual attitudes of those who are frequent attendees (which would theoretically be more positive than infrequent attendees) would be partially clouded by those who are overreporting attendance.

Although to a lesser extent, social desirability bias may also be occurring with the questions on what respondents believe about immigration. Respondents may be more

likely to report positive attitudes in a survey when their actual attitudes towards immigrants are more negative (although much of the immigration measures here indicate largely negative attitudes). This has been found to occur with surveys on immigration (Ural 2009) and race, especially when an interviewer is involved (Kryson 1998). However, because this is a telephone survey, the effect of social desirability may be reduced. It also may be less of a factor here because the dependent variables ask about immigration attitudes and not racial attitudes directly, although much of the immigrant population are racial minorities.

Another limitation of this study is in how some of the immigration attitudes items are worded. The respondent is asked how immigration might affect only their community, not Nebraska or the United States in general. This wording may create variance in responses in a state like Nebraska where immigration rates are highly concentrated to certain areas. For example, for the item “Immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community”, some respondents may answer no simply because they recognize immigration rates to their community is low, not because they hold negative attitudes. Fortunately, most of the items ask about what effect might occur as a result of hypothetically more immigrants to their community, not the effect of current immigration.

An association between church attendance and attitudes was found, but it may not be church attendance which actually causes improved attitudes. Some third variable, such as a drive to be engaged in and improve the community, could be driving both church attendance and improved immigration attitudes. A longitudinal study would be

helpful to begin disentangling causality, where infrequent church attendees are surveyed after a period of increased attendance about their immigration attitudes. It is certainly possible, however, that attending church would improve attitudes given the largely positive message of church doctrine and teachings towards immigration.

In addition to possibly conducting a longitudinal study, future research could continue to look at regional differences in how religious variables might affect immigration attitudes. Because of historical differences in immigration rates and settlement patterns, how or if religious affiliation and/or attendance affect immigration attitudes may vary among smaller regions within the U.S. It would be interesting to analyze how immigration rates to a certain region affect this relationship. Do places with high or low immigration rates show that religion can make immigration attitudes more positive? For example, if immigration rates are high, possible contact with immigrants within and outside churches could affect the relationship between religious affiliation or attendance and immigration attitudes.

Qualitative research examining if or how respondents believe their religious affiliation or attendance affects their attitudes on immigration would add significantly to the current research. Themes on exactly how this relationship works could better translate church doctrine and teachings into useful methods to improve attitudes. This information would also allow us to analyze the actual effect church clergy and the official stance on immigration have and whether and how the messages are being transferred from clergy to congregants.

This study was able to fill a gap in the literature concerning the possible effect of religious affiliation and attendance on immigration attitudes. The few past studies looking at this relationship did not have such a thorough measure of the dependent measures of attitudes. This study utilized seven separate items regarding a variety of immigration topics in a region where attitudes may differ from national samples. The comprehensive measures of various topics of immigration covered here along with the differences in findings depending on the dependent variable show that future studies should consider keeping items on immigration attitudes separate for analysis. Instead of one index of all items, respondents were free to differ in their attitudes among the various topics of immigration. For example, Evangelicals expressed negative attitudes on the economy but were no different than the other religious groups on topics such as crime, jobs, and government spending.

Results here point to the possibility that church attendance can help to improve immigration attitudes. If we can further examine how this relationship works, it will be easier to utilize churches and their message in the organized efforts to ease tension between the foreign and native-born populations. Indeed, churches have already joined in the movement to improve attitudes towards immigrants. If we can further understand which methods best improve attitudes through this already-existing social network, we will be able to help communities be more open to these newcomers.



TABLE 1- DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES

Variables	<i>n</i>	Percentage or mean	Standard deviation	Max	Min
<b>Independent Variables</b>					
<i>Affiliated</i>					
Catholic	965	85.0		1	0
Evangelical	370	32.6		1	0
Mainline	321	28.3		1	0
Frequent Attendance	274	24.1		1	0
	535	47.1		1	0
<b>Control Variables</b>					
<i>Education</i>					
High school or less	377	33.2		1	0
Some college	345	30.4		1	0
Bachelor's degree or higher	413	36.4		1	0
Age	1,135	56.0	16.0	23	100
Female	658	58.0		1	0
<i>Political Ideology</i>					
Liberal	203	17.9		1	0
Moderate	448	39.5		1	0
Conservative	484	42.6		1	0
Nonwhite	39	3.4		1	0
Urban	901	79.4		1	0
Income	1,135	2.7	1.3	1	5
<b>Dependent Variables (collapsed into dichotomous variables)</b>					
Immigrants improve the economy of my community	382	34.5		1	0
Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	763	69.6		1	0
Immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community	640	57.5		1	0
Higher economic growth	414	37.6		1	0
People born in my community losing their jobs	509	46.0		1	0
Higher crime rates	757	67.8		1	0
Making my community more open to new ideas and cultures	736	66.0		1	0

TABLE 2- DISTRIBUTIONS AND PERCENTAGES OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES VARIABLES

	Very unlikely/ Strongly disagree	Unlikely/ Disagree	Neither agree or disagree	Likely/ Agree	Very likely/ Strongly agree	n (%)
Immigrants improve the economy of my community	114 (10.3)	429 (38.8)	181 (16.4)	355 (32.1)	27 (2.4)	1,106 (100)
Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	26 (2.4)	185 (16.9)	123 (11.2)	507 (46.2)	256 (23.3)	1,097 (100)
Immigrants improve the ethnic and cultural diversity of my community	70 (6.3)	302 (27.1)	101 (9.1)	561 (50.4)	79 (7.1)	1,113 (100)
Higher economic growth	220 (20.0)	373 (33.9)	94 (8.5)	340 (30.9)	74 (6.7)	1,101 (100)
People born in my community losing their jobs	139 (12.6)	391 (35.3)	68 (6.1)	326 (29.5)	183 (16.5)	1,107 (100)
Higher crime rates	73 (6.5)	194 (17.4)	93 (8.3)	434 (38.9)	323 (28.9)	1,117 (100)
Making my community more open to new ideas and cultures	114 (10.2)	194 (17.4)	71 (6.4)	552 (49.5)	184 (16.5)	1,115 (100)

Row percentages are in parentheses

TABLE 3- DISTRIBUTIONS AND PERCENTAGES OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS BY ATTENDANCE

	Infrequent Attendees	Frequent Attendees	<i>n</i> (%)
Catholics	141 (38.1)	229 (61.9)	370 (100)
Mainline Protestants	192 (59.8)	129 (40.2)	321 (100)
Evangelical Protestants	97 (35.4)	177 (64.6)	274 (100)
<i>n</i> (%)	430 (44.6)	535 (55.4)	965

Row percentages are in parentheses

TABLE 4. ODDS RATIOS FOR AGREEMENT WITH THE ITEM  
 "IMMIGRANTS IMPROVE THE ECONOMY OF MY COMMUNITY", LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Affiliated</i>	0.76 (0.16)	0.81 (0.18)					
<i>Religious Groups</i>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			1.22 (0.22)	1.09 (0.21)			1.04 (0.20)
Evangelical			0.70 † (0.12)	0.64 * (0.14)			0.60 * (0.14)
<i>Attendance</i>							
Frequent					1.20 (0.18)	1.20 (0.21)	1.28 (0.22)
<i>Controls</i>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		0.96 (0.21)		1.19 (0.28)		1.14 (0.26)	1.18 (0.27)
Bachelor's degree or higher		2.10 *** (0.43)		2.31 *** (0.52)		2.18 *** (0.50)	2.21 *** (0.50)
Age		0.99 (0.01)		0.99 (0.01)		0.99 (0.01)	0.99 (0.01)
Female		0.84 (0.13)		0.68 * (0.11)		0.69 * (0.11)	0.67 * (0.11)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		1.89 ** (0.39)		1.79 * (0.42)		1.91 ** (0.44)	1.83 ** (0.43)
Conservative		1.01 (0.17)		1.17 (0.21)		1.05 (0.19)	1.14 (0.21)
Nonwhite		3.62 *** (1.41)		5.01 *** (2.23)		5.05 *** (2.26)	4.97 *** (2.20)
Urban		0.92 (0.18)		0.91 (0.19)		0.92 (0.20)	0.91 (0.19)
Income		1.13 † (0.08)		1.12 (0.08)		1.12 (0.08)	1.12 (0.08)
<i>n</i>	1,106	1,106	943	943	943	943	943
chi-squared	1.71	67.66 ***	8.00 *	66.56 ***	1.33	62.04 ***	69.76 ***
degrees of freedom	1	10	2	11	1	10	12
R-squared	0.0018	0.0613	0.0092	0.0716	0.0015	0.0652	0.0736
Loglikelihood	-725.73	-682.49	-602.03	-564.12	-606.73	-567.99	-562.90

† p ≤ 0.10 \* p ≤ 0.05 \*\* p ≤ 0.01 \*\*\* p ≤ 0.001

TABLE 5- ODDS RATIOS FOR AGREEMENT WITH THE ITEM  
 "GOVERNMENT SPENDS TOO MUCH MONEY ASSISTING IMMIGRANTS", LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<b>Affiliated</b>	0.99 (0.22)	0.86 (0.21)					
<b>Religious Groups</b>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.77 (0.15)	0.82 (0.18)			0.90 (0.20)
Evangelical			0.98 (0.22)	0.86 (0.22)			0.97 (0.24)
<b>Attendance</b>							
Frequent					0.70 * (0.12)	0.63 * (0.12)	0.64 * (0.12)
<b>Controls</b>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		0.83 (0.19)		0.86 (0.21)		0.88 (0.21)	0.88 (0.21)
Bachelor's degree or higher		0.43 *** (0.09)		0.42 *** (0.10)		0.45 *** (0.10)	0.45 *** (0.11)
Age		1.01 * (0.01)		1.01 † (0.01)		1.02 * (0.01)	1.01 * (0.01)
Female		0.72 * (0.12)		0.74 † (0.13)		0.76 (0.13)	0.76 (0.13)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		0.46 *** (0.10)		0.55 * (0.13)		0.53 ** (0.13)	0.53 ** (0.13)
Conservative		1.13 (0.21)		1.23 (0.25)		1.31 (0.26)	1.30 (0.27)
Nonwhite		0.33 ** (0.14)		0.20 *** (0.10)		0.20 *** (0.10)	0.21 *** (0.10)
Urban		0.63 * (0.13)		0.77 (0.16)		0.78 (0.16)	0.78 (0.17)
Income		1.00 (0.07)		1.03 (0.08)		1.03 (0.08)	1.03 (0.08)
<b>n</b>	1,097	1,097	930	930	930	930	930
chi-squared degrees of freedom	0.00 1	67.38 *** 10	2.18 2	51.58 *** 11	4.31 * 1	55.35 *** 10	55.65 *** 12
R-squared	0.0000	0.0712	0.0026	0.0690	0.0053	0.0753	0.0757
Log likelihood	-690.360	-641.22	-578.19	-539.71	-576.63	-536.03	-535.83

† p ≤ 0.10 \* p ≤ 0.05 \*\* p ≤ 0.01 \*\*\* p ≤ 0.001

TABLE 6. ODDS RATIOS FOR AGREEMENT WITH THE ITEM  
 "IMMIGRANTS IMPROVE THE ETHNIC AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY OF MY COMMUNITY", LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Affiliated</i>	0.75 (0.16)	0.80 (0.18)					
<i>Religious Groups</i>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.94 (0.17)	0.82 (0.15)			0.78 (0.15)
Evangelical			1.02 (0.19)	0.99 (0.20)			0.93 (0.20)
<i>Attendance</i>							
Frequent					1.20 (0.18)	1.22 (0.20)	1.26 (0.21)
<i>Controls</i>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		1.41 † (0.27)		1.54 * (0.31)		1.51 * (0.31)	1.52 * (0.31)
Bachelor's degree or higher		2.98 *** (0.58)		3.00 *** (0.63)		2.90 *** (0.62)	2.89 *** (0.62)
Age		0.99 † (0.01)		0.99 * (0.01)		0.99 * (0.01)	0.99 * (0.01)
Female		0.97 (0.15)		0.83 (0.13)		0.81 (0.13)	0.81 (0.13)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		1.56 * (0.33)		1.39 (0.33)		1.41 (0.33)	1.42 (0.33)
Conservative		0.82 (0.13)		0.81 (0.14)		0.79 (0.13)	0.79 (0.14)
Nonwhite		1.54 (0.69)		1.30 (0.62)		1.24 (0.62)	1.29 (0.64)
Urban		1.58 * (0.29)		1.66 ** (0.32)		1.64 * (0.32)	1.65 ** (0.32)
Income		1.09 (0.07)		1.04 (0.07)		1.04 (0.07)	1.04 (0.07)
<i>n</i>	1,113	1,113	947	947	947	947	947
chi-squared degrees of freedom	1.80	85.95 ***	0.23	69.10 ***	1.45	69.06 ***	71.08 ***
R-squared	1	10	2	11	1	10	12
Loglikelihood	0.0020	0.0697	0.0002	0.0651	0.0015	0.0652	0.0670
	-747.37	-696.04	-633.09	-592.00	-632.30	-591.98	-590.83

†  $p \leq 0.10$  \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

TABLE 7- ODDS RATIOS FOR RESPONDING THAT  
"HIGHER ECONOMIC GROWTH" IS LIKELY, LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<u>Affiliated</u>	0.82 (0.17)	0.95 (0.21)					
<u>Religious Groups</u>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.98 (0.18)	0.81 (0.15)			0.81 (0.16)
Evangelical			0.78 (0.16)	0.69 † (0.15)			0.70 † (0.15)
<u>Attendance</u>							
Frequent					0.85 (0.13)	0.91 (0.15)	0.96 (0.16)
<u>Controls</u>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		0.89 (0.18)		1.04 (0.23)		1.03 (0.23)	1.05 (0.23)
Bachelor's degree or higher		1.23 (0.24)		1.30 (0.29)		1.32 (0.29)	1.31 (0.29)
Age		0.98 *** (0.01)		0.98 ** (0.01)		0.98 ** (0.01)	0.98 ** (0.01)
Female		0.82 (0.12)		0.69 * (0.11)		0.71 * (0.11)	0.69 * (0.11)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		1.92 ** (0.39)		2.20 *** (0.50)		2.26 *** (0.52)	2.20 *** (0.50)
Conservative		1.20 (0.20)		1.38 † (0.25)		1.33 (0.25)	1.38 † (0.25)
Nonwhite		2.76 * (1.12)		3.88 ** (1.95)		3.81 ** (1.91)	3.88 ** (1.96)
Urban		1.71 ** (0.34)		1.77 ** (0.37)		1.75 ** (0.37)	1.77 ** (0.37)
Income		1.04 (0.07)		1.05 (0.08)		1.05 (0.08)	1.05 (0.08)
<u>n</u>	1,101	1,101	935	935	935	935	935
chi-squared degrees of freedom	0.91	52.75 ***	1.86	52.87 ***	1.12	51.52 ***	52.86 ***
R-squared	1	10	2	11	1	10	12
Loglikelihood	0.0009	0.0500	0.0020	0.0618	0.0012	0.0592	0.0618
	-744.73	-708.19	-622.69	-585.39	-623.17	-586.99	-585.36

† p ≤ 0.10 \* p ≤ 0.05 \*\* p ≤ 0.01 \*\*\* p ≤ 0.001



TABLE 8- ODDS RATIOS FOR RESPONDING THAT  
 “PEOPLE BORN IN MY COMMUNITY LOSING THEIR JOBS” IS LIKELY, LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Affiliated</i>	0.87 (0.18)	0.86 (0.18)					
<i>Religious Groups</i>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.88 (0.16)	0.94 (0.18)			0.99 (0.19)
Evangelical			1.10 (0.21)	1.15 (0.24)			1.22 (0.26)
<i>Attendance</i>							
Frequent					0.81 (0.12)	0.83 (0.13)	0.81 (0.14)
<i>Controls</i>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		0.86 (0.16)		0.89 (0.18)		0.90 (0.18)	0.89 (0.18)
Bachelor's degree or higher		0.45 *** (0.09)		0.43 *** (0.09)		0.45 *** (0.09)	0.44 *** (0.09)
Age		1.01 † (0.00)		1.01 (0.01)		1.01 (0.01)	1.01 (0.01)
Female		1.02 (0.15)		1.15 (0.18)		1.16 (0.18)	1.17 (0.18)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		0.84 (0.18)		1.08 (0.25)		1.04 (0.24)	1.06 (0.25)
Conservative		1.12 (0.18)		1.14 (0.20)		1.21 (0.21)	1.18 (0.21)
Nonwhite		0.54 (0.23)		0.56 (0.29)		0.56 (0.30)	0.57 (0.30)
Urban		1.35 † (0.24)		1.32 (0.25)		1.32 (0.25)	1.33 (0.25)
Income		0.92 (0.06)		0.96 (0.06)		0.96 (0.06)	0.96 (0.07)
<i>n</i>	1,107	1,107	941	941	941	941	941
chi-squared degrees of freedom	0.43 1	45.26 *** 10	1.53 2	37.42 *** 11	1.89 1	37.24 *** 10	38.40 *** 12
R-squared	0.0004	0.0386	0.0016	0.0379	0.0019	0.0381	0.0395
Loglikelihood	-761.20	-732.17	-637.72	-614.59	-637.52	-614.44	-613.53

†  $p \leq 0.10$  \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$



TABLE 9- ODDS RATIOS FOR RESPONDING THAT  
"HIGHER CRIME RATES" ARE LIKELY, LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<u>Affiliated</u>	0.96 (0.21)	0.86 (0.20)					
<u>Religious Groups</u>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.78 (0.15)	0.87 (0.17)			0.95 (0.20)
Evangelical			0.92 (0.20)	0.90 (0.21)			1.01 (0.23)
<u>Attendance</u>							
Frequent					0.73 * (0.12)	0.65 * (0.12)	0.65 * (0.12)
<u>Controls</u>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		0.97 (0.21)		0.93 (0.22)		0.96 (0.22)	0.96 (0.22)
Bachelor's degree or higher		0.48 *** (0.10)		0.46 *** (0.10)		0.50 ** (0.11)	0.50 ** (0.11)
Age		1.02 *** (0.01)		1.02 *** (0.01)		1.02 *** (0.01)	1.02 *** (0.01)
Female		0.78 (0.12)		0.75 † (0.13)		0.77 (0.13)	0.77 (0.13)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		0.74 (0.16)		0.88 (0.21)		0.85 (0.20)	0.85 (0.20)
Conservative		1.13 (0.20)		1.22 (0.23)		1.30 (0.25)	1.29 (0.25)
Nonwhite		0.41 * (0.17)		0.41 † (0.20)		0.42 † (0.22)	0.42 † (0.22)
Urban		0.70 † (0.13)		0.74 (0.15)		0.75 (0.15)	0.75 (0.15)
Income		1.09 (0.07)		1.11 (0.08)		1.11 (0.08)	1.11 (0.08)
<i>N</i>	1,117	1,117	949	949	949	949	949
chi-squared degrees of freedom	0.04 1	55.48 *** 10	1.77 2	47.46 *** 11	3.85 * 1	50.54 *** 10	50.60 *** 12
R-squared	0.0000	0.0522	0.0019	0.0537	0.0044	0.0597	0.0598
Log likelihood	-715.83	-678.49	-602.16	-570.97	-600.66	-567.32	-567.24

†  $p \leq 0.10$  \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

TABLE 10- ODDS RATIOS FOR RESPONDING IT IS LIKELY THAT IMMIGRATION IS  
 “MAKING MY COMMUNITY MORE OPEN TO NEW IDEAS AND CULTURES”, LOGISTIC REGRESSION

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<u>Affiliated</u>	1.04 (0.23)	1.09 (0.25)					
<u>Religious Groups</u>							
Catholic (Mainlines are omitted)			0.79 (0.14)	0.72 † (0.14)			0.68 * (0.14)
Evangelical			1.04 (0.21)	1.05 (0.23)			0.97 (0.21)
<u>Attendance</u>							
Frequent					1.30 † (0.21)	1.28 (0.21)	1.32 (0.23)
<u>Controls</u>							
Some college (HS or lower are omitted)		1.58 * (0.30)		1.64 * (0.34)		1.62 * (0.33)	1.63 * (0.33)
Bachelor's degree or higher		2.39 *** (0.48)		2.12 *** (0.45)		2.04 *** (0.44)	2.02 *** (0.43)
Age		1.00 (0.01)		1.00 (0.01)		1.00 (0.01)	1.00 (0.01)
Female		0.99 (0.15)		1.05 (0.17)		1.01 (0.16)	1.02 (0.16)
Liberal (Moderates are omitted)		1.45 † (0.32)		1.14 (0.27)		1.14 (0.28)	1.15 (0.28)
Conservative		0.87 (0.14)		0.83 (0.15)		0.82 (0.14)	0.80 (0.14)
Nonwhite		2.71 * (1.34)		2.79 † (1.55)		2.56 † (1.40)	2.74 † (1.48)
Urban		1.47 * (0.26)		1.58 * (0.30)		1.55 * (0.30)	1.58 * (0.30)
Income		1.06 (0.07)		1.08 (0.08)		1.07 (0.08)	1.08 (0.08)
<i>n</i>	1,115	1,115	946	946	946	946	946
chi-squared degrees of freedom	0.03 1	50.20 *** 10	2.46 2	39.89 *** 11	2.74 † 1	37.23 *** 10	42.52 *** 12
R-squared	0.0000	0.0420	0.0028	0.0395	0.0030	0.0367	0.0423
Log likelihood	-709.29	-679.50	-593.26	-571.40	-593.13	-573.09	-569.75

†  $p \leq 0.10$  \*  $p \leq 0.05$  \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$  \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$

## REFERENCES

- Bean, Clive. 1995. "Determinants of Attitudes towards Questions of Border Maintenance in Australia." *People and Places* 3(3):32-40.
- Bean, Frank D., Mark A. Fossett, and Kyung T. Park 2000. "Labor Market Dynamics and the Effects of Immigration on African Americans." Pp. 143-162 in *Immigration and Race: New Challenges for American Democracy*, edited by Gerald D. Jaynes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Betts, Katharine. 1988. *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976-1987*. Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press.
- Beutel, Ann M. and Margaret M. Marini. 1995. "Gender and Values." *American Sociological Review* 60:436-448.
- Brenneman, Robert. 2008. *Faith and the Foreigner: Exploring the Impact of Religion on Immigration Attitudes*. Saarbrücken, Germany: VDM Publishing.
- Burns, Peter and James G. Gimpel. 2000. "Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 115(2):201-225.
- Campbell, David E. and J. Q. Monson. 2003. "Following the Leader? Mormon Voting on Ballot Propositions." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 42(4):605-619.
- Chandler, Charles and Yung-mei Tsai. 2001. "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey." *The Social Science Journal* 38(2):177-188.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics* 59(3):858-881.
- Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, and Donald P. Green. 1990. "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change." *The Journal of Politics* 52:1124-1154.
- Cross, Susan E. and Laura Madson. 1997. "Models of the Self: Self-Construals and Gender." *Psychological Bulletin* 122(1):5-37.
- Dalla, Rochelle, Amy Ellis, and Sheran Cramer. 2005. "Immigration and Rural America." *Community, Work & Family* 8(2):163-185.

- Daniels, Joseph and Marc Von Der Ruhr. 2005. "God and the Global Economy: Religion and Attitudes towards Trade and Immigration in the United States." *Socio-Economic Review* 3(3):467-489.
- Djupe, Paul A. and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2002. "The Political Voice of Clergy." *Journal of Politics* 64(2):596-609.
- Dustmann, Christian and Ian P. Preston. 2007. "Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to Immigration." *The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy* 7(1):Article 62.
- Espenshade, Thomas and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration." *International Migration Review* 30(2):535-570.
- Fennelly, Katherine and Christopher Federico. 2008. "Rural Residence as a Determinant of Attitudes toward U.S. Immigration Policy." *International Migration* 46(1):151-190.
- Fry, Richard. 2008. "Latino Settlement in the New Century." Pew Hispanic Center. Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/96.pdf>).
- Gilbert, Kathy L. 2007. "Immigration meeting urges hospitality to strangers." The United Methodist Church. Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://www.umc.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=1wL4KnN1LtH&b=2429869&ct=3531605>).
- Green, John C. 2007. *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Greenberg, Stan; Greenberg, Anna; Hootkin, Julie; Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research. 2004. *The Changing Shape of Minnesota: Reinvigorating Community and Government in the New Minnesota*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
- Griswold, Frank T. 2006. "Presiding Bishop's statement on immigration policy." The Episcopal Church. Retrieved April 10, 2010 ([http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3687\\_73490\\_ENG\\_HTM.htm](http://www.episcopalchurch.org/3687_73490_ENG_HTM.htm)).
- Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1969. *The Gathering Storm in the Churches*. Doubleday.
- Hamil-Luker, Jenifer and Christian Smith. 1998. "Religious Authority and Public Opinion on the Right to Die." *Sociology of Religion* 59(4):373-391.

- Haubert, Jeannie and Elizabeth Fussell. 2006. "Explaining Pro-Immigrant Sentiment in the U.S.: Social Class, Cosmopolitanism, and Perceptions of Immigrants." *International Migration Review* 40(3):489-507.
- Hogg, Michael A., Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White. 1995. "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory." *Social Science Quarterly* 58(4):255-269.
- Hood, M.V. and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. "Give us your Tired, your Poor. But Make Sure they have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion toward Immigration." *Political Behavior* 20(1):1-15.
- Johnson, Monica K. and Margaret M. Marini. 1998. "Bridging the Racial Divide in the United States: The Effect of Gender." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 61(3):247-258.
- Knoll, Benjamin. 2009. "'And Who is my Neighbor?' Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 48(2):313-331.
- Land, Richard. 2006. "Immigration Crisis Requires Biblical Response." The Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission. Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://erlc.com/article/immigration-crisis-requires-biblical-response/>).
- Lee, Jenny J. 2002. "Religion and College Attendance: Change among Students." *The Review of Higher Education* 25(4):369-384.
- Legge, Jr., J. S. 1983. "The Determinants of Attitudes toward Abortion in the American Electorate." *The Western Political Quarterly* 36(3):479-490.
- Mayda, Anna M. 2006. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants." *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 88(3):510-530.
- McDaniel, Eric, Irfan Nooruddin, and Allyson Shortle. 2011. "Divine Boundaries: How Religion Shapes Citizens' Attitudes Toward Immigrants." *American Politics Research* 39(1):205-233.
- McIntosh, William A. 1979. "The Differential Impact of Religious Preference and Church Attendance on Attitudes towards Abortion." *Review of Religious Research* 20(2):195-213.
- McLaren, Lauren M. 1996. "Individual and Contextual Explanations of Support for the Rights of Immigrants in Western Europe." PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX.

Michaud, Kristy. 2009. "The Good Steward." Working paper, Department of Political Science, California State University, Northridge.

Migration Policy Institute. 2011. "2010 American Community Survey and Census Data on the Foreign Born by State." MPI Data Hub: Migration Facts, Stats, and Maps. Retrieved September 27, 2011 (<http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/acscensus.cfm#rankings>).

Moore, Stephen. 1986. "Social Scientists' Views on Immigrants and U.S. Immigration Policy." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 487:213-217.

National Association of Evangelicals. 2009. "Immigration 2009." Retrieved October 6, 2011 (<http://www.nae.net/government-relations/policy-resolutions/354-immigration-2009>).

Ortega, Francesc and Javier G. Polavieja. 2010. "Labor-market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration." Center for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Madrid.

Passel, Jeffrey and D'Vera Cohn. 2009. "Mexican Immigrants: How Many Come? How Many Leave?" Pew Hispanic Center. Retrieved September 27, 2011 (<http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=112>).

Pew Hispanic Center. 2009. "Changing Faiths: Latinos and the Transformation of American Religion." Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/75.1.pdf>).

Presbyterian Church (USA) Office of Immigration Issues. 2006. "Presbyterian Policy on Immigration." Office of the General Assembly. Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://oga.pcusa.org/immigration/pdf/immigration-resolution-2006.pdf>).

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60(4):586-611.

Sikora, Joanna. 2009. "Religion and Attitudes Concerning Euthanasia." *Journal of Sociology* 45(1):31-54.

Simon, Rita J. 1985. *Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880-1980*. University of Michigan: Lexington Books.

Smidt, Corwin E., ed. 2004. *Pulpit and Politics: Clergy in American Politics at the Advent of the Millenium*. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press.

Steensland, Brian, Jerry Z. Park, Mark D. Regnerus, Lynn D. Robinson, W. B. Wilcox, and Robert D. Woodberry. 2000. "The Measure of American Religion." *Social Forces* 79(1):291-318.

Tajfel, Henri. 1982. "Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations." *Annual Review of Psychology* 33:1-39.

Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1979. *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monteray, California: Brooks/Cole.

The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. 2010. "U.S. Religious Landscape Survey." Retrieved October 6, 2011 (<http://religions.pewforum.org/affiliations>).

U.S. Census Bureau. 2009. "Nebraska: Age and Sex." American Community Survey 5-year Estimates. Retrieved September 27, 2010 ([http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?\\_bm=y&-geo\\_id=04000US31&-qr\\_name=ACS\\_2009\\_5YR\\_G00\\_S0101&-ds\\_name=ACS\\_2009\\_5YR\\_G00\\_&-redoLog=false](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable?_bm=y&-geo_id=04000US31&-qr_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_S0101&-ds_name=ACS_2009_5YR_G00_&-redoLog=false)).

United States Census Bureau 2010. 2011. "U.S. Census Bureau Delivers Nebraska's 2010 Census Population Totals, Including First Look at Race and Hispanic Origin Data for Legislative Redistricting." Census 2010. Retrieved September 27, 2011 (<http://2010.census.gov/news/releases/operations/cb11-cn57.html>).

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 2002. "Migration and Refugee Services." Retrieved April 10, 2010 (<http://www.usccb.org/about/migration-and-refugee-services/>).

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Von Der Ruhr, Marc and Joseph Daniels. 2003. "The Relationship between Religious Affiliation, Region, Race, and Attitudes towards Globalization." *Faith & Economics* 42:26-39.

Vu, Michelle A. 2009. "Evangelicals make Case for Welcoming Immigrants." *The Christian Post*. Retrieved October 6, 2011 (<http://www.christianpost.com/news/evangelicals-make-case-for-welcoming-immigrants-37823/>).

- Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Jr., S. S. Hill. 1988. "Churches as Political Communities." *The American Political Science Review* 82(2):531-548.
- Welch, Michael R. and David C. Legee. 1988. "Religious Predictors of Catholic Parishioners' Sociopolitical Attitudes: Devotional Style, Closeness to God, Imagery, and Agentic/Communal Religious Identity." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 27(4):536-552.
- Whitehead, Andrew L. 2010. "Sacred Rights and Civil Rights: Religion's Effect on Attitudes toward Same-Sex Unions and the Perceived Cause of Homosexuality." *Social Science Quarterly* 91(1):63-79.
- Wilson, Thomas C. 1994. "Trends in Tolerance toward Rightist and Leftist Groups, 1976-1988: Effects of Attitude Change and Cohort Succession." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58(4):539-556.
- Wood, Peter B. and John P. Bartkowski. 2004. "Attribution Style and Public Policy Attitudes toward Gay Rights." *Social Science Quarterly* 85(1):58-74.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.